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SEPARATION ACTIONS IN NEW YORK: DOES ADULTERY

CONSTITUTE THE EXCLUSIVE DEFENSE TO AN ACTION
FOUNDED ON ADULTERY?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1947, for the first time in New York,' the "commission of an act of
adultery" became a separate ground for separation, "except ...
where the
plaintiff has also been guilty of adultery under such circumstances that the
defendant would have been entitled, if innocent, to a divorce." 2 Prior to that
enactment, it had been held, in proceedings upon the then existing grounds for
separation, that the defense of justification, or recrimination, would prevent a
spouse guilty of any misconduct from obtaining relief 3 No attempt was made
in 1947 to reconcile the apparently exclusive defense of adultery with the
traditional and general defense of recrimination. Therefore, in the absence of
any clear legislative intent or subsequent judicial construction, it is still uncertain whether, in New York, plaintiff's misconduct, other than adultery
constitutes a defense to an action based on adultery.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOP=IENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF RECRPhXINATION

Although the doctrine of recrimination, in effect if not in name, can be found

in the Mosaic Law,4 it was first applied as such by the Ecclesiastical Courts
of England.? It was there that recrimination or compcnsatio criminum0 was
popularized as a natural outgrowth of the equitable maxim of "clean hands."'
As the court was quick to point out, "[IIt would be hard if a man could complain
of the breach of a contract which he has violated .. . ."' In theory, the complaining spouse must have acted dutifully toward the offending spouse in order
to obtain relief. 9 This approach to marital difficulties was perfectly reasonable,
for "otherwise, the wife [or husband] would have nothing to do, but to mis1. Between 1S13 and 1947, the New York separation statute underwent, with one exception, no substantial revisions. Compare N.Y. Sess. Laws 1313, ch. 102, §§ 10, 13, with
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1161, 1163. The exception was the inclusion of the husband's right
to sue, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1324, ch. 205, § 12, which, when contested as a result of other
legislation, was affirmed by Perry v. Perry, 10 N.Y. Ch. 501 (1831).
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 774 (now N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 200(5)).
3. See notes 23 & 29 infra and accompanying text
4. Deuteronomy 22:13-19. If a husband made false accusations concerning his wife's
premarital chastity, he would be estopped from ever divorcing her. This penalty is, in
effect, recrimination.
5. See 12 Halsbury, Laws of England ff 395 (3d ed. 1955) and accompanying
notes. "The Ecclesiastical Courts borrowed from the later Roman Law the doctrines of
compensatio criminis expressed by them in the phrase that the petitioner must come into
Court with dean hands . . . . " Tickner v. Tickner, [1924] P. 113, 119 (remarks of
King's Proctor).
6. Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 7S9, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (Con. CL 1799).
7. Reeves v. Reeves, 2 Phill. Ecc. 125, 161 Eng. Rep. 1097 (Con. Ct. 1813).
3. Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 789, 790, 162 Eng. Rep. 755, 756 (Con. CL 1799).
9. Taylor v. Taylor, 2 Lee. 172, 161 Eng. Rep. 303 (Con. Ct. 1755).
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conduct herself, provoke the ill treatment, and then complain."' 0 Not all lapses
of duty, however, were given equal weight as bars to relief. Consonant with
the belief that adultery was the most serious offense against matrimony," less
serious transgressions would not bar an action founded upon adultery. 12' In
practice, therefore, the court required that the recriminatory offense be at
least equally as grave as the one charged. Once established, however, the
defense of recrimination was automatically applied.
In a major court reorganization in 1858,13 the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical
Court was superseded 4 by a Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. 1
The act directed the new court to "give Relief on Principles and Rules which
in the Opinion of the said Court shall be as nearly as may be conformable to
the Principles and Rules on which the Ecclesiastical Courts have heretofore
acted ... ."16 The statute opened the door to a use of discretion' 7 not pre-

viously possible under the Ecclesiastical Courts. Beyond relaxing the "equal
gravity rule" of the earlier courts,' 8 making it more difficult to obtain a separation, the new courts, motivated by "general interests of the morality of the
country,"' 9 were reluctant to make full use of the potential of the act. " With
10. Waring v. Waring, 2 Phil. Ecc. R. 132, 133, 161 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1099 (Con. Ct. 1813).
Accord, Astley v. Astley, I Hagg. Ecc. 714, 162 Eng. Rep. 728 (Con. Ct. 1828).
11. See Harris v. Harris, 2 Hagg. Ecc. 376, 162 Eng. Rep. 894 (Con. Ct. 1829).
12. Id. at 411-16, 162 Eng. Rep. at 907-08, wherein the court stated, "there is no point
. . . more settled, than that cruelty cannot be pleaded in bar of a charge of adultery."
Id. at 411, 162 Eng. Rep. at 907.
13. Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85 (repealed).
14. Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 2 (repealed).
15. Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 3 (repealed). The
grounds for action were adultery, cruelty, and two years desertion. Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 16 (repealed).
16. Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 22 (repealed).
17. Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 31 (repealed).
18. Sopwith v. Sopwith, 2 Sw. & Tr. 160, 169, 164 Eng. Rep. 954, 958 (Div. Ct. 1861)
(dictum). This early case decided under the new statute stated: "[I]n a suit instituted by the
husband for divorce on account of adultery, the wife may plead cruelty, desertion, or such
wilful misconduct as has conduced to the adultery . . . ." Ibid. Prior to 1858, it had been
held that cruelty could not be pleaded by the wife as a bar to a separation sought by the
husband on the ground of adultery. Cocksedge v. Cocksedge, 1 Rob. Ecc. 90, 163 Eng.
Rep. 975 (Con. Ct. 1844).
19. Marven v. Marven, 122 L.T.R. (n.s.) 227 (P. 1919).
20. In Brooke v. Brooke, [1912] P. 136, 146, the court stated that discretion should be
used cautiously, carefully and consistently, "not merely in accordance with what may be
desirable or right for the parties immediately concerned . . . but also in accordance with
what is right in the interests of public decency, and of the State." An earlier court had
suggested that discretion should be regulated and "not [be] a free option subordinated to no
rules." Morgan v. Morgan, L.R. 1 P. & D. 644, 647 (1869). Nevertheless, it was generally
accepted that discretion was unlimited but should be exercised as suggested in Brooke v.
Brooke, supra. Holland v. Holland, [1918] P. 273 (C.A.); Wickens v. Wickens, [1918]
P. 265 (C.A.); Hines v. Hines, [1918] P. 364 (citing exceptional circumstances which
should be present before discretion is used).
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some degree of prophecy, however, one court did recognize the occasional in-

compatibility between discretion and the blind application of recrimination
and recommended that, in such a contingency, the latter be disregarded. 2 ' The
implication was obvious. The public may be better served by severing an unsuccessful union rather than by punishing equally guilty spouses by denying
22
them relief.

This precedent-breaking approach to matrimonial actions reached a climax
when, in the case of Blunt v. Blunt,2 the House of Lords declared: "There is
no reason in principle why, where both sides are in mercy, if the judge decides
to exercise his discretion, he should not exercise it in favour of both parties
and pronounce the decree without drawing a distinction between them.' 4
Once begun, the movement away from the rigid application of recrimination
common in the Ecclesiastical Courts, was steady and relatively swift. Even
if the drafters of the act of 1358 intended only procedural rather than substantive changes in the law, they provided the vehicle through which the
equitable concept, that required the court to deny relief to erring spouses as
a sort of punishment, became instead the concept that the public good is better
served by freeing mutually discontented spouses.
IH. THE DocTRiNE

n NEw YoRK

By statute, New York has adopted the defense of recrimination, or justification,26 and has in its application looked to procedures established by the Ecclesiastical Courts, especially the requirement of "clean hands."2- 7 Starting from
21. Constantinidi v. Constantinidi, [1903] P. 246, 258-59.
22. Tickner v. Tickner, [1924] P. 118.
23. [1943] 2 All E.R. 76 (H.L.).

24. Id. at Si.
25. In the period between 1S58 and the Blunt decision in 1943, England changed from a
policy of strict application of recrimination to the policy of dual divorce, as is shown by
the discussion above. The fact that this change has not been confined solely to England
is illustrated by Canadian decisions folloving Blunt. In E. v. E., 16 Mar. Prov. 474, (1943]
2 D.,.R. 313 (N.B. Div. CL 1942), the court adopted the position that it had discretion
to grant a decree of divorce even though the petitioner was guilty of adultery. However,
this discretion was exercised where petitioner v.as guilty only of an isolated act of misconduct after respondent had committed many. In this respect the courts poition appears to be closer to comparative rectitude. See note 39 infra. This position was comerbat
liberalized in favor of Blunt by Mansfield v. Mansfield, 24 Mar. Prov. 71, (1949] 3 D.L.R.
115 (N.S.). Here the Novia Scotia Supreme Court reversed the trial court, stating that the
judge did not weigh all the facts in exercising his discretion. The court cited Blunt as a guide
and stated: "I do think that in this case the interests of the community at large would be
far better served by dissolving the marriage and ... thus enable them to recstablish themselves and their offspring, if any, as respectable members of the community, than by refusing
to do so." Id. at 81, [1949] 3 D.L.R. at 120.

26. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 202.
27. Vernes v. Vernes, 232 App. Div. 707, 247 N.Y. Supp. 798 (2d Dep't 1931)
(memorandum decision); Axelrod v. Axelrod, 2 Misc. 2d 79, 159 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct.
1956). In Vernes v. Vernes, supra at 707, 247 N.Y. Supp. at 799, the court pointed out
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the assumption that the separation statute was not intended to benefit a misbehaving complainant, 28 courts have held that any misconduct, whether or not
tantamount to an independent ground for separation, will constitute a bar."
To aid the court in its determination, a telescopic approach to separation has
been adopted, bringing into focus the entire relationship 0 of the parties in the
performance of their mutual obligations.3' In this regard, New York goes
further than the Ecclesiastical Courts in requiring the complainant to be an
innocent party. Soundly criticizing this approach, a lower court,32 echoing
Blunt, has pointed out that "the result of a rigid application of the doctrine of
recrimination is that the bonds of matrimony, broken by both parties, are the
more closely riveted, and the unhappiness of the parties is made the reason for
the continuance of their union." 33
The quandary created by New York's interpretation of the doctrine is particularly manifest in actions founded upon adultery. From the status of the divorce
law in New York, 4 it can be properly inferred that adultery is still regarded
as the most serious matrimonial offense. Paradoxically, prior to 1947, adultery
did not constitute an independent ground for separation. 3 However, to compensate for the inadequacy of the statute, the court of appeals had held that
"if the adultery is open and notorious.. . two wrongs arise out of the act: the
adultery itself . . .and cruelty .

. . ."36

Even though adultery was, thereafter,

at least the equivalent of statutory cruelty, no court took the initiative to
revert to the practice of -the Ecclesiastical Courts when adultery could be met
only by countercharges of adultery. As a result, in the comparatively few cases
that "in equity .. .the plaintiff
misbehavior."

. . .

may have forfeited her right to relief by her subsequent

28. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605 (1926),; Spade v. Spade, 6 Misc. 2d
170, 163 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
29. Clarke v. Clarke, 159 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1957), which held that the wife's in-

sistence upon having her mother live with them was misconduct barring her action for
her husband's abandonment.
30.

Powers v. Powers, 84 App. Div. 588, 590, 82 N.Y. Supp. 1022, 1024 (2d Dep't

1903); Todd v. Todd, (Sup. Ct.) in N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1958, p. 12, col. 7. In Todd, tile
court stated: "Both of the parties have engaged in a course of conduct that precludes
them from relief in equity." Id. col. 8.
31.

Deisler v. Deisler, 59 App. Div. 207, 69 N.Y. Supp. 326 (2d Dep't 1901). The

court stated that "in cases of this character it is important that the court know what has
been the conduct of the wife toward the husband, as well as what has been his conduct
toward her .... " Id. at 212, 69 N.Y. Supp. at 330, citing Hopper v. Hopper, 19 N.Y. Ch.
46, 48 (1844).

32. Scheidler v. Scheidler, (Sup. Ct.) in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1960, p. 19, col. 1.
33.

Id. col. 3.,

34. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 170-77.
35. Allen v. Allen, 125 App. Div. 838, 110 N.Y. Supp. 303 (1st Dep't 1908). W sued H
for separation alleging adultery. Denying relief, the court stated: "It is apparent that the
complaint does not state a cause of action for a separation .. .for the mere allegation that
the defendant has been guilty of adultery has never been held to amount to an allegation
of cruel and inhuman treatment . . . ." Id. at 839, 110 N.Y. Supp. at 303-04.
36. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 232 N.Y. 215, 218, 133 N.E. 450, 451 (1921).
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in which adultery (as cruelty) was countered with allegations of complainant's
misconduct not amounting to adultery, the courts, in an historic oversight,
made no
effort to weigh the gravity of the offenses and relieve the more innocent
37
spouse.
Consequently, it would not be inconsistent with the 1947 amendment to
hold that a reversion to the ecclesiastical practice was in fact contemplated by
the legislature. Nevertheless, the statute is unclear. It is unfortunate that, in
drafting the 1947 amendment, no attempt was made to clarify whether plaintiff's adultery would thereafter constitute the exclusive defense to a separation
action based upon adultery. To hold otherwise would make the specification of
this particular defense redundant since the general statutory defense of misconduct certainly comprehends adultery.
Yet, to say simply that the specific controls the general, as has been done in
other cases,38 is not altogether apposite where the specific neither contradicts
the general nor purports to be exclusive. Furthermore, such a solution would
fail to take cognizance of several principles upon which New York has traditionally acted. First, it would establish a hierarchy of defenses within the
separation law. Secondly, it would adopt, by implication, a form of comparative
rectitude39 granting relief to the less guilty spouse. Thirdly, it would introduce
a double standard in applying recrimination, making it easier to avoid the doctrine in cases of adultery than in any other.
37. McKee v. McKee, 241 App. Div. 149, 271 N.Y. Supp. 3S4 (Ist Dep't 1934), rev'd
on other grounds, 267 N.Y. 96, 195 N.E. 809 (1935); Kamman v. Kamman, 167 App. Div.
423, 152 N.Y. Supp. 579 (4th Dep't 1915). In Fragomeni v. Fragomeni, 112 X.YS.2d 224
(Sup. Ct. 1952), W sued and H counterclaimed for separation, each alleging adultery. The
court denied relief to both, stating that W "'had been guilty of misconduct which is
made a bar under the statute to her recovery . . . .' [it follows that defendant's [Hi
counterclaim for separation should also be dismissed on the merits ....11Id. at 226, quoting
from Hawkins v. Hawkins, 193 N.Y. 409, 412, S6 N.E. 463, 469 (1908). Quaere: In ,iew of
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 200(5) and its specific defense of adultery, why did the court
phrase the defense in the instant case in the term misconduct? Was the court making it
the paramount test?
3S. See, e.g., Gwynne v. Board of Educ., 259 N.Y. 191, 131 N.E. 353 (1932); Erie
County Water Authority v. Kramer, 4 App. Div. 2d 545, 167 N.Y.S.2d 557 (4th Dep't
1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 954, 157 N.E.2d 712, 1S4 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1959); Baker v.Springer,
270 App. Div. 639, 62 N.Y.S.2d 907 (3d Dep't 1946); Papiernick v. City of New York,
202 Misc. 717, 115 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Moldofsky v. Triborough Bridge &
Tunnel Authority, 199 Misc. 225, 99 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
39. Comparative rectitude weighs the guilt of both parties and grants relief to the
less guilty spouse. See Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 41S (1956); Hendricks
v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d 366 (1953). The test applied in Eals v. Swan, 221
La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952), lucidly explains the doctrine, holding that "while mutual,
equal fault operates as a bar to relief ... the courts consider in each case the degree of
guilt, and only where . .. [it]
has been equal is the suit dismissed." Id. at 333, 59 So. 2d
at 410. (Emphasis omitted.) See Smith v. Smith, 139 So. 2d 813 (La. 19621; Gilbert v.
Hutchinson, 135 So. 2d 233 (La. 1961).
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IV. THE DocTRINE IN OTHER STATES

The problem is not peculiar to New York. In other jurisdictions, however, the problem arises more often in divorce proceedings. The neighboring
jurisdictions of New Jersey and Pennsylvania have statutes which specifically
state that adultery will bar an action based on adultery. 40 New Jersey, nevertheless, has held that any statutory ground for divorce will constitute a bar",
because the statute "does not nullify the unwritten law. . . . [and] the recrimination doctrine is firmly embedded as part of our statutory and unwritten
law." 42 Although the Pennsylvania statute requires the complainant to be
"innocent and injured," 43 impliedly justifying the application of recrimination
as in New Jersey, a 1958 decision 4 clarified that state's position. While not
disturbing the application of the doctrine in cases other than adultery, Pennsylvania now holds that "any statement or inference [in any other decision 40 ]
that conduct actually amounting to other grounds for divorce may be a
defense in an action based on adultery was unintended and must be considered
as purely gratuitous. '46 Illinois, like Pennsylvania, in spite of a judicially
established condition that the complainant be an "innocent party,"47 has
cruelty, desertion and
refused to permit other grounds for divorce, including
48
drunkenness, to recriminate a charge of adultery.
40. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-7 (1952); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 52 (1955).
41. Cusick v. Cusick, 129 N.J. Eq. 82, 86, 18 A.2d 292, 294 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941), citing
with approval Csanyi v. Csanyi, 93 N.J. Eq. 11, 115 Atl. 76 (Ch. 1921); Young v. Young,
94 N.J. Eq. 155, 119 At. 92 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922); Rapp v. Rapp, 67 N.J. Eq. 236, 58
At!. 167 (Ch. 1904); Seibert v. Seibert, 83 At. 230, 233 (N.J. Ch. 1922) (dictum) (grounds
less than statutory grounds could not be used).
42. Huster v. Huster, 64 N.J. Super. 29, 34, 165 A.2d 305, 308 (App. Div. 1960).
43. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 10 (1929).
44. Berezin v. Berezin, 186 Pa. Super. 340, 142 A.2d 741 (1958).
45. Rech v. Rech, 176 Pa. Super. 401, 107 A.2d 601 (1954); Newman v. Newman, 170
Pa. Super. 238, 85 A.2d 613 (1952).
46. Berezin v. Berezin, 186 Pa. Super. 340, 345, 142 A.2d 741, 743-44 (1958). In Manley v.
Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960), the court cited Berezin for the general
proposition that only adultery could recriminate adultery, but nevertheless extended the
defenses to an action for adultery to include insanity of the defendant at the time of the
adultery.
IDuberstein v. Dubersteln,
47. "Divorce is a remedy provided for an innocent party . ...
171 Ill. 133, 145, 49 N.E. 316, 320 (1897). See Elston v. Elston, 344 111. App. 233, 100
N.E.2d 635 (1951), where the court required that "'to maintain a bill for separate maintenance by a wife against her husband, she must not only show that she has good cause for
living separate and apart from him, but also that such separation was without fault on her
part . . . .' Id. at 241, 100 N.E.2d at 640, quoting from Bielby v. Bielby, 333 111.478, 486,
165 N.E. 231, 234 (1929).
48. In Bast v. Bast, 82 Ill. 584, 585 (1876), the court stated: "We do not think his
desertion can exonerate the wife from the more serious charge of adultery. Neither that,
nor drunkenness, nor cruelty, will, under our statute, constitute a sufficient recriminatory
defense to a charge of adultery." See Huling v. Huling, 38 Ill. App. 144 (1890) (per
curiam). It should be noted, however, that the term "same statutory character" used in
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Neither MIassachusetts 49 nor Wisconsin" ° have statutes specifically establishing adultery as a defense to adultery. Since the Massachusetts statute establishes no hierarchy among its grounds for divorce,51 it has been held that the
recriminatory charge need not be the same as the one complained of, so long
as it is itself an independent ground for divorce. 2 Until recently, Wisconsin
adhered to a similar policy. A lower court was restrained from adopting a
more liberal approach, such as in Blunt, by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 3 which
suggested that any change in the established recriminatory policy "should come
through the legislature. '1 4 In 1960, the legislature, endorsing a policy of comparative rectitude when dealing with charges of adultery, authorized the court
to grant in its discretion a separation to the spouse guilty of the lesser offense.i
The discretion which Wisconsin courts have been empowered to use by
statute has been assumed in far greater measure by California courts. Two
recent decisionsP have thrust that state into the mainstream of the revised
attitude toward matrimonial problems forecast by Blunt, where equal guilt is7
no longer a reason for denying relief. The court in De Burgh v. De Burgh,
the more important of the two decisions, disapproving of the mechanical application of recrimination, 5s urged that California look instead to the public
benefit to be derived from ending the masquerade of a marriage. 9
Duberstein v. Duberstein, supra note 47, at 145, has been construed to mean that offenses
App. 321, rev'd on
of a like nature can recriminate each other. Garrett v. Garrett, 160 IMI.
other grounds, 252 MII.318, 96 N.E. 882 (1911).
49. Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mlass. 760, 763, 59 X.E.2d 775, 777 (1945). The
grounds for divorce are found in Mlass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 203, §§ 1-2 (1955).
50. See Roberts v. Roberts, 204 Wis. 401, 236 N.W. 135 (1931). The grounds for divorce
are found in Wis. Stat. § 247.07 (1961).
51. Reddington v. Reddington, 317 lass. 760, 763, 59 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1945).
52. Id. at 764, 59 N.E.2d at 777.
53. Bahr v. Bahr, 272 Wis. 323, 75 N.W.2d 301 (1956). "The established recrimination
doctrine stands in the way of a decree in favor of either party as culpable as both are here."
Id. at 326, 75 N.W.2d at 302.
54. Id. at 326, 75 N.W.2d at 303.
55. "[Wlhere it appears from the evidence that both parties have been guilty of misconduct sufficiently grave to constitute cause for divorce, the court may in its dizcretion
grant a judgment of legal separation to the party whose equities on the whole are found
to be superior." Wis. Stat. § 247.101 (1961).
56. De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d S58, 250 P.2d 59S (1952) (suggesting that in
cases of equal guilt each party should receive a divorce); Mlueller v. Mueller, 44 Cal. 2d
527, 2S2 P.2d 369 (1955) (granting a divorce to both parties even though the doctrine of
recrimination might have been applied).
57. 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 593 (1952).
58. Id. at 369, 250 P.2d at 605.
59. Id. at 364, 250 P.2d at 601. Judge Traynor noted that the public considerations when
one party is guilty of a matrimonial offense are doubled when both are guilty. He also
stated that "it would be froward indeed for the court, when it is called upon to evaluate an
alleged recriminatory defense, to ignore the growing awareness that a marriage in name only
is not a marriage in any real sense." Id. at 86S, 250 P.2d at 603. See Phillips v. Phillips, 41
Cal. 2d 869, 877, 264 P.2d 926, 930 (1953).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION

As indicated, there are four avenues of approach to the problem of recrimination, three of which employ in varying degrees the traditional method of recrimination applied in the Ecclesiastical Courts: one, New York's present
approach, the meticulous application of "clean hands"; two, a modified version
of the above, followed in Massachusetts and New Jersey, permitting any
statutory ground to recriminate; three, a compromise approach found in
Pennsylvania, Illinois and Wisconsin, calling for the application of comparative rectitude. The fourth approach, differing from and disapproving of all of
the above, is the modem, post-Blunt adaptation of the law practiced in California, which encourages the use of absolute judicial discretion to free spouses
rather than to punish them.
New York's broad application of the defense of justification inevitably means
difficulty in securing a separation if there is a genuine contest. This result is
indicative of New York's attitude toward marital affairs in general, including
the question of divorce. Without doing violence to the meaning of the statute,
a more reasonable interpretation of recrimination would limit the defense
minimally to misconduct sufficient to support an independent action for separation, and, in the case of adultery, would include a serious consideration of
the use of comparative rectitude. Nevertheless, the traditional reluctance to
facilitate divorce or separation in New York, having precluded the adoption of
the former interpretation, may well prevent the adoption of the latter. In any
case, the adoption of absolute discretion would represent such a complete
reversal of policy that it is likely that the courts would be reluctant to take
this step without specific legislative endorsement.

